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MARKET POWER AND SWITCHING COSTS:  
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF ONLINE NETWORKING MARKET 
Shin-Ru Cheng* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Digital platforms have a profound influence on our lives. Specifically, 
online networking platforms are actively involved in our social activities1 
and have morphed into significant information centers, providing more 
convenient ways to learn about the world.2 Although there are countless 
digital platforms, ten networks are dominating the digital space. Based on 
2019 statistics, the top ten social networking platforms in the United 
States, measured by the number of monthly users, are Facebook, 
Instagram, Facebook Messenger, Twitter, Pinterest, Reddit, Snapchat, 
WhatsApp, Messenger by Google, and Tumblr.3  
Facebook owns four of the top ten platforms. It controls Instagram, 
Facebook Messenger, and WhatsApp,4 covering the vast majority of the 
market. Facebook generated $85,965 million in 2020,5 and the company’s 
chief executive officer, Mark Zuckerberg, has become one of the 
wealthiest entrepreneurs on the planet.6 His wealth could be used unjustly 
if Facebook takes advantage of market failure instead of providing 
services in a more productive way.7 Therefore, it is essential to identify 
what causes markets to fail, examine what would occur if the tech market 
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Bar Association. Admission to California bar expected in December 2021. This Article constitutes part of 
my J.S.D. dissertation. I am deeply indebted to Professor Lee Epstein, Professor Gerrit DeGeest and 
Professor John Drobak for all their valuable advice on this Article. I also appreciate all editors for their 
assistance. 
 1. See SCOTT GALLOWAY, THE FOUR: THE HIDDEN DNA OF AMAZON, APPLE, FACEBOOK, AND 
GOOGLE, at 100-04 (2017). 
 2. See Malwina Popio, The Role of Facebook in the Process of Acquiring Information INT. J. 
EDUC. CULT. SOC. NO 1 2015, 24-25 (2015).  
 3. See Most popular mobile social networking apps in the United States as of September 2019, 
by monthly users, STATISTA (Jul. 6, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/248074/most-popular-us-
social-networking-apps-ranked-by-audience/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 4. See Facebook, Annual Report (Form 10-K, 3) (Jan. 28, 2021). 
 5. Facebook’s Annual Revenue from 2009 to 2020, STATISTA (Feb. 5, 2021), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/268604/annual-revenue-of-facebook/. 
 6. See Forbes World’s Billionaire List: The Richest in 2021, (Kerry A. Dolan et al. eds.)  FORBES 
(2021), https://www.forbes.com/billionaires/ (choose “Mark Zuckerberg” from dropdown; then click 
“Full Profile”). 
 7. Unlike profits gained from productive behaviors, the artificial profits (also called “rent”) 
generated by exploiting market failure results in income inequality. See GERRIT DE GEEST, RENT: HOW 
MARKETING CAUSES INEQUALITY, 4-6 (2018). 
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failed, and take action to remove market distortions.8 
Facebook’s overwhelming dominance9 in the marketplace has attracted 
multiple antitrust investigations. Authorities are concerned that 
“Facebook may have put consumer data at risk, reduced the quality of 
consumers’ choices, and increased the price of advertising.”10 
Furthermore, several scholars are encouraging these investigations into 
Facebook’s data harvesting activities.11 Based on the concerns of 
policymakers, the number of antitrust investigations implicating 
Facebook and other online networking platforms will likely increase. 
The Sherman Act guides all antitrust inquiries in the United States. 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes unlawful, conduct that “cause[s] an 
increase in market power…that is not competition on the merits.”12 
Accordingly, to prove Facebook violated Section 2 of the Act, a 
complainant would have to demonstrate that Facebook acquired 
monopoly power,13 referring to a substantial level of market power.14 
Alternatively, one can prevail upon showing “a dangerous probability of 
achieving monopoly power.”15 
Based on this definition, antitrust inquiries depend upon an accurate 
definition of a commercial entity’s market power. Traditionally, market 
power was defined as “a firm’s ability to increase profits by reducing 
output and charging more than a competitive price for its products.”16 To 
 
 8. Id. at 5. The author has indicated several methods that a company may employ to distort market 
competition, such as reducing market transparency, exploiting non-informed consumers, lock-in effects 
and network externalities, and exploiting human beings’ irrationality. Id. at 3. 
 9. Based on social media site visits, Facebook has nearly 71.8 percent market share in the United 
States. See Leading Social Media Websites in the United States in May 2021, Based on Share of Visits, 
STATISTA (Jun. 17, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/265773/market-share-of-the-most-popular-
social-media-websites-in-the-us. 
 10. See Annie Palmer, 47 Attorneys General Are Investigating Facebook For Antitrust Violations 
CNBC (Oct. 22, 2019, 11:07 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/22/47-attorneys-general-are-
investigating-facebook-for-antitrust-violations.html. 
 11. See, e.g., Diana Srinivasan, The Antitrust Case Against Facebook: A Monopolist’s Journey 
Towards Pervasive Surveillance in Spite of Consumers’ Preference for Privacy 16 BERKELEY BUS. L. J., 
98-101 (2019); Keith Hylton, Digital Platforms and Antitrust Law 98 NEB. L. REV. 272, 296. 
 12. A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust Law Is Not That Complicated, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 163, 166 
(2017). 
 13. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 45 (D.C. Cir., 2001) (“Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act makes it unlawful for a firm to ‘monopolize’ 15 U.S.C. § 2. The offense of monopolization has two 
elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or 
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of product, 
business acumen, or historic accident” (citation omitted)).  
 14. See Mark R. Patterson, Google and Search Engine Market Power, HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 6 
(2013). 
 15. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993). (reasoning that establishing 
attempted monopolization requires proof “(1) that the defendant has engaged in predatory or 
anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of 
achieving monopoly power.”). 
 16. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
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concretize this abstract definition, various approaches have been 
proposed. The market share approach17 and the entry barriers approach18 
are the two most frequently adopted by courts. Less frequently, courts 
adopt the switching costs approach and various other methods, which rely 
on market structures or correlations between prices and costs. 
In United States v. Microsoft, 19 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit applied the switching costs approach to assess the market 
power of an online networking platform. In simple terms, the switching 
costs approach infers market power based on consumers’ abilities to 
switch from one provider to another.20  
The switching costs approach is suitable for assessing the market 
power of Facebook because, in the absence of exterior competition and 
presence of high entry barriers, the ability to switch within a market is a 
critical mechanism to facilitate competition.21 In fact, this approach has 
been used in several other cases related to digital products.22  
Courts have recognized the utility of this approach in the context of 
 
PRACTICE, 106 (2016).  
 17. Several approaches have been advanced by courts. The market share approach is accepted by 
courts and regulatory agencies. It can be applied to a wide variety of markets. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT, 21 
(2008).  The approach determines the market power by relying on firms’ market share, which offers a 
straightforward and practical method for trial purposes. Id. at 21-25.  
 18. The other commonly utilized method is the entry barriers approach, first mentioned by the 
Supreme Court in 1992. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 485 (1992).  
The approach focuses on the possibility of entering the market at issue. Specifically, the approach claims 
that if potential competing firms can easily enter the market, or the existing firms can expand output to 
the market without significant difficulties, the market is competitive, regardless of the market 
concentration. This is because challenges from current and potential competing firms frustrate the 
monopolists’ efforts to set super-competitive prices.  
 19. To prove that Microsoft (defendant) had monopoly power, the Department of Justice (Plaintiff) 
showed that Microsoft owned more than 95 percent of market share in Intel-compatible operating system. 
Furthermore, more than 7000 Microsoft applications were unavailable in competing operating systems 
(such as Mac OS). This constituted a substantial compatibility switching cost. United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 55-56, 60 (D.C. Cir., 2001). The Court found Microsoft’s monopoly power on the 
ground that “customers would not switch from Windows to a Mac OS in response to a substantial price 
increase because of the costs of acquiring the new hardware needed to run Mac OS (an Apple computer 
and peripherals) and compatible software applications, as well as because of the effort involved in learning 
the new system and transferring files to its format.” Id. at 52. 
 20. See generally, Universal Avionics Sys. Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 184 F. Supp. 2d 947, 
955 (D. Ariz. 2001). 
21 Here, Facebook’s interior competition refers to the competition among existing online networking 
platforms, such as Instagram, Twitter, and Snapchat. Due to the presence of entry barriers, potential 
entrants could not pose a threat to Facebook. Therefore, interior competition plays a much more important 
role in maintaining market competition.  
22 See Aaron S. Edlin & Robert G. Harris, The Role of Switching Costs in Antitrust Analysis: A 
Comparison of Microsoft and Google, 15 YALE J. L. & TECH. 169, 189-91 (2013).  Edlin and Harris 
concluded that switching costs play an essential role in antitrust law analysis in three dimensions: (1) 
narrowing market definition (2) assessing market power; and (3) exclusionary conduct. Id. 
 
3
Cheng: Market Power and Switching Costs
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
2021] MARKET POWER AND SWITCHING COSTS 125 
online networking platforms. For example, in Microsoft, the court 
concluded that Microsoft had monopoly power in the operating systems 
market based on  the switching costs approach, holding that high 
switching costs in Microsoft’s operating system constituted substantial 
entry barriers.23 These entry barriers, in turn, indicated a substantial level 
of market power. Going forward, researchers should apply the switching 
costs approach to measure the market power of other online networking 
platforms. 
Accordingly, this Article presents the author’s own empirical study 
(“the study”) that analyzes Facebook’s market power under the switching 
costs approach. The study examines users’ switching behaviors in 
response to significant changes in Facebook’s service quality. As an 
initial hypothesis, the study assumes that if users are able to switch to 
other platforms because of Facebook’s inferior service, then low or 
moderate switching costs in the market can be inferred. The study 
determines that, under the switching costs approach, Facebook would not 
have sufficient market power to constitute a violation of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.  
Part II of this Article addresses the role of switching costs analyses in 
antitrust investigations. Part III presents the author’s study, illustrating the 
empirical methodology, including data collection and analysis. Part III 
also provides several observations regarding application of the switching 
costs approach to guide decisionmakers in their analysis of the market 
power of other digital platforms. Finally, Part IV summarizes the main 
findings of the study.  
II. LOCK-IN EFFECTS AND MARKET POWER 
According to the switching costs approach, firms gain a large market 
share by locking-in users through significant exit costs.24 These exit costs 
may originate from market structures or firms’ policies. The costs, in turn, 
create market barriers for new entrants.25 In this regard, this Part explains 
the economic concept of switching costs and resulting lock-in effects as 
 
 23. See Microsoft, 253 F. 3d, at 19-24. 
 24. Jiawei Chen & Michael Sacks, Reimbursing Consumers’ Switching Costs in Network 
Industries, NET INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER NO. 16-13, 1 (2016). 
 25. Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-in: Competition With Switching 
Costs and Network Effects, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUS. ORG. 1967 1974, 1998-2001, (M. Armstrong & R. 
Porter eds., 2007). Paul Klemperer, Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs 97 
ECON. J. 99, 99 (1987) [hereinafter Klemperer, Entry Deterrence]. Paul Klemperer, Competition When 
Consumers Have Switching Costs: An Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization 
Macroeconomics, and International Trade, 62 REV. ECON. STUD. 515, 536 (1995) [hereinafter Klemperer, 
Competition]. Pei-yu Chen & Lorin M. Hitt, Information Technology and Switching Costs 9 (2005), 
available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.458.1995&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
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well as how online networking platforms may produce switching costs.   
A. Switching Costs and Lock-In Effects 
The presence of switching costs can be observed through several 
examples, such as buyers having to repeatedly purchase similar products 
from the same supplier. In another scenario, buyers would have to 
“purchase follow-on products such as service and repair” from the same 
supplier.26 Switching costs can come from various sources, including 
market structures and product designs.27  
Switching costs play a crucial role in consumption decisions. 
Economic research has highlighted, based on switching costs, the 
correlation between a product’s utility level and purchasing decisions.28 
For example, imagine that there are two customers: A and B. In this 
scenario, A purchased product X based on the product’s utility level. In 
addition to product X, consumers may purchase product Y. There are two 
periods in which consumers may decide which product to purchase.29  
In each period, customers A and B have three options: purchase X, 
purchase Y, or make no purchase at all.30 u stands for utility. 𝑢𝑃
𝐶  stands 
for the utility the customer gained from purchasing the product. S stands 
for switching costs and Ø stands for the product. 𝑆Ø𝑃
𝐶  stands for the 
switching costs associated with purchasing the product. Conversely, 𝑆𝑃Ø
𝐶  
stands for the switching costs associated with not purchasing the product. 
The utilities of each decision in period A are as follows.31  
 











𝐵 − 𝑆Ø𝑌 
𝐵  
No Purchase − 𝑆𝑋Ø 
𝐴  0 
 
The chart illustrates that, compared to customer B who has no previous 
experience purchasing X, customer A tends to purchase X because the 
switching costs are 𝑆𝑋𝑌 
𝐴 and 𝑆Ø𝑌 
𝐴 . Accordingly, A will decide to switch 
from product X to product Y only if the utility of product Y is higher than 
A’s switching costs—𝑆𝑋𝑌 
𝐴 and 𝑆Ø𝑌 
𝐴 . Therefore, “[a]n excellent product 
 
 26. See Farrell & Klemperer, supra note 25, at 1972. 
 27. See Edlin & Harris, supra note 22, at 176. 
 28. See Chen & Hitt, supra note 25, at 4-6.  
 29. Id. at 4. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. at 5. 
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can have poor sales if customers face high switching costs.”32 By contrast, 
switching costs may maintain a low quality product’s competitive 
advantage.33   
Lock-in effects occur when there are “switching costs that are 
sufficiently high so that buyers stay with a current supplier rather than 
switching to a supplier whose products they consider to be preferable (or, 
alternatively, that the costs of switching suppliers exceed the benefits of 
switching).”34  
In practice, locking-in customers is a common business strategy to 
retain customers—of course, in addition to providing superior products.35 
This is particularly true in markets where fixed costs and the costs 
associated with obtaining new customers are particularly high.36 For the 
former, firms need switching costs to retain a minimum number of 
customers to cover fixed costs; for the latter, switching costs attract new 
customers in an affordable manner. Information-related industries 
highlight how switching costs influence profitability,37 a point discussed 
below in reference to Facebook.    
B. Switching Costs in the Online Networking Market  
At first glance, it seems that switching among online networking 
platforms is an effortless process for consumers. Technically speaking, 
users can leave Facebook with the click of a button. Additionally, 
Facebook does not set switching restrictions—neither contractually nor 
through its practices. Switching to other online networking platforms is 
free for consumers. Moreover, Facebook users are able to download their 
own personal data from the website.38 Complete data migration, moving 
data from one platform to another, ensures that users’ important digital 
documents will not be lost during the process of switching to another 
platform. 
However, some features of Facebook suggest the opposite. Leaving 
Facebook may create substantial switching costs for businesses and 
 
 32. Id. at 7-8. 
 33. Id. at 8. 
 34. See Edlin & Harris, supra note 22, at 176. 
 35. See Chen & Hitt, supra note 25, at 443, (noting that “a firm can be successful at retaining 
customers either because they offer superior products (at least for a specific set of consumers), or because 
they have high switching costs.”). 
 36. Id. at 438. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Accessing & Downloading Your Information, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/1701730696756992?helpref=hc_global_nav (last visited Sept. 17, 
2021). In some jurisdictions, Facebook has an obigation to port users’ data to appointed platforms upon 
request.] 
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individual users, including compatibility costs, uncertainty costs, and 
learning costs. Literature in the field of economics has identified several 
types of switching costs.39 The following Sections discuss the types of 
switching costs and switching costs’ impact on the online networking 
market.   
1. Search Costs 
Search costs are incurred in the process of finding and understanding 
new suppliers.40 Search costs depend on the degree of transparency in the 
market. The securities market is comparatively transparent because 
various security regulations require issuers to disclose relevant and 
important information to investors. Similarly, the insurance market and 
other highly regulated industries that impose mandatory disclosure 
requirements on companies tend to be more transparent. Accordingly, 
search costs are low in these markets. 
Search costs are induced if comparing prices between products 
becomes harder for consumers. Big data analysis technologies are 
growing in sophistication. Consequently, online shopping platforms can 
capture consumers’ consumption preferences more precisely and generate 
personalized prices at no cost.41 Because personalized prices are set 
depending on the willingness of individual consumers to purchase 
products, such products lose their standard prices for comparison 
purposes. As a result, it is difficult for consumers to determine whether 
prices are fair, and additional resources are usually necessary for 
consumers to obtain relevant information about such products. 
Moreover, search costs can be induced through product design. Sellers 
can design several types of products with similar functions to promote 
more transactions. A common example of this practice is the sale of 
cookies. Companies sell different types of cookies in different boxes with 
varying prices. This strategy makes comparing the products futile. 
This rather simple example of a cookie box can also apply to online 
networking platforms. Facebook provides personalized services to each 
user. For example, Facebook recommends “friends” to a specific user 
depending on the user’s already-existing friend network. Facebook also 
displays personalized news and sends targeted advertisements. 
 
 39. See Edlin & Harris, supra note 22, at 178. 
 40. Id. at 181. See also Chen & Hitt, supra note 25, at 446. 
 41. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE 
NETWORK ECONOMY 37 (1998). Price strategies include: (1) personalized pricing to “[s]ell to each user 
at a different price”; (2) versioning to “[o]ffer a product line and let users choose the version of the product 
most appropriate for them”; and (3) group pricing to “[s]et different prices for different groups of 
consumers, as in student discount.” Id. at 39. 
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Additionally, it allows users to customize privacy settings. Because of 
these personalized services, each individual user may have a different 
experience with Facebook. Consequently, the seeming uniqueness of each 
Facebook account makes it difficult to undertake a comparison of users’ 
experiences on the platform.42  
It is noteworthy that consumers having additional information does not 
necessarily translate into a reduction in search costs. This observation is 
particularly relevant to online networking platforms. For example, 
Facebook publishes privacy policies on its website, and users can easily 
access these policies. Given that the policies are written in legal jargon 
with lengthy and detailed sentences, readers must spend considerable time 
reading them to understand them. Errors in readers’ interpretations of 
these clauses should therefore be expected.43   
2. Compatibility Costs  
The second type of switching costs arises because of products’ 
incompatibilities with various other products. When a current product is 
incompatible with a new product, buyers are often required to obtain 
follow-on products from the same seller. Without follow-on products, the 
buyer may lose the current product’s utility.44 In this scenario, the utility 
lost is a compatibility cost. For example, when a cellphone buyer chooses 
Apple’s iPhone, the buyer is locked into follow-on products designed by 
Apple, such as the App Store, Apple-compatible chargers, and other 
accessories.  
Recent research suggests that network effects are strong in the online 
networking market. Thus, users who contemplate switching to other 
platforms face significant compatibility costs. Network effects refer to 
when a product’s value increases as more people use the product. 
Network effects arise in markets where “every adoption thus 
complements every other.”45 For example, Facebook’s overall value 
 
 42. In a transparent market, information products price competition will ultimately reduce price to 
zero. The reason is that in such a market, “competitive forces tend to move the price toward marginal cost, 
the cost of producing an ‘addition’ copy,” which is close to zero for information products. Id. at 24-25. 
To avoid cut-throat price competition, firms must differentiate products or “achieve cost leadership.” Id. 
at 32-33. 
 43. Johnson’s empirical research investigated 10,000 Internet household and three commodity-
like products and found that “households visit only 1.2 book sites, 1.3 CD sites, and 1.8 travel sites”, 
which shows “the amount of online searches is actually quite limited.” See Eric J. Johnson, et al., On the 
Depth and Dynamics of Online Search Behavior, 50 MGMT. SCI.299, 299 (2004). This suggests that even 
though the Internet has made information more accessible to customers, additional information does not 
necessarily promote more switching and lead to price or quality competition. 
 44. See Edlin & Harris, supra note 22, at 178. See also Klemperer, Competition, supra note 25, at 
517. 
 45. See Farrell & Klemperer, supra note 25, at 2007. See also Edlin & Harris, supra note 22, at 
8
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increases when additional users join the network; those users contribute 
more information to Facebook’s ecosystem, which makes the website 
more attractive to non-users.46 Indeed, because of network effects, 
Facebook has become the largest online networking platform in the 
United States. Therefore, once Facebook users switch to other platforms, 
they lose opportunities to engage with existing users. 
For businesses, leaving Facebook for another platform may involve 
significant financial losses. A great number of businesses rely on 
Facebook to advertise their products. At the same time, consumers count 
on Facebook to seek out relevant products and businesses.47 Hence, 
businesses have to establish their presence on Facebook. They must build 
their reputation, promote their products, and foster client relationships. 
All of this requires major upfront commitments. Therefore, leaving 
Facebook is equivalent to abandoning established connections with 
consumers. Because of their fear of losing established networks, 
businesses are discouraged from switching to other online networking 
platforms. The same response is observed in non-business users. Non-
business Facebook users may spend years building their own friendship 
networks and personalized homepages with unique personal images. 
These individuals may use Facebook as their primary tool for 
communicating with friends. At present, there is no comparable 
alternative to Facebook. Thus, users may feel socially isolated if they 
leave the platform. As a result, while Facebook allows users to transfer 
their data to other platforms, this data may be useless if it cannot be easily 
stored and managed on another online networking platform.48 Therefore, 
compatibility costs resulting from switching to other online networking 
platforms may be inevitable.49   
As discussed above, personalized services implicate compatibility 
costs. Data-driven businesses provide personalized services50 to meet 
 
178 (arguing “the benefits of adoption by any single user increases as other consumers adopt”). 
 46. About Marketplace for Business, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/289268564912664?id=150605362430228. 
 47. Id. 
 48. In practice, Facebook has launched policies allowing users to transfer their personal data across 
platforms, such as transferring photos on Facebook to Google Photos. William Morland, Data Transfer 
Project: Enabling portability of photos and videos between services, FACEBOOK, 
https://engineering.fb.com/2019/12/02/security/data-transfer-project/.  However, these policies are 
insufficient to conclude that cross platform data transfers have reduced entry barriers. More importantly, 
it is not certain whether Facebook will allow its competing platforms to request a large-scale data transfers 
on behalf of users. 
 49. Scholars classify the costs incurred due to data portability as transaction costs. See Edlin & 
Harris, supra note 22, at 181. 
 50. Firms can identify their customers’ preferences by relying on the following tools: “cookie, log 
files, data mining technologies, customer profiling techniques, collaborative filtering technologies (e.g., 
recommendation systems) and other personalization technologies.” See Chen & Hitt, supra note 25, at 
454.  
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their users’ personal needs.51 As a result, when users leave these data-rich 
environments, they lose the value of such personalized services.52  
3. Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs are costs incurred in the course of a transaction, 
including the money, time, and effort spent on transacting.53 Transaction 
costs are inevitable. These costs deter consumers from switching to other 
products when it is unclear the expected gains of switching exceed 
potential transaction costs.54  
Indeed, modern technology reduces transaction costs. For example, in 
the past, traders spent much time and effort traveling from one place to 
another to complete transactions. Modern communication technologies 
make remote communication possible. Facebook Messenger and other 
communication applications offer a free and convenient way for traders 
to communicate with their clients. Accordingly, travel is no longer 
necessary to make important communications. 
Modern technologies also simplify business transactions.55  For 
example, some websites allow users to create accounts on their platform 
with  Facebook identities, saving the time it would take to create a new 
account and change the platform’s default settings to the user’s 
preferences.56 
Conversely, technological developments have created new types of 
transaction costs. For example, because each online networking platform 
adopts different formats to store and organize data, technical barriers can 
deter data sharing and portability. Until solutions to these issues are 
discovered, users who migrate between platforms must accept higher 
transaction costs.57 
4. Learning Costs 
When receiving a new product, one has to learn how it functions.58 All 
 
 51. Id.  See also Rory Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 117 MICH. L. REV. 815, 827, 829 
(2019) (noting regular customers can use companies’ artificial intelligent algorithms to recommend 
“where to buy the products, evaluate their price and quality, and update the consumer along the way or 
give preapproval notifications if preferred”). 
 52. Chen & Hitt, supra note 25, at 454. 
 53. See Edlin & Harris, supra note 22, at 181. See also Paul Klemperer, Markets with Consumer 
Switching Costs 102 Q. J. ECON. 375, 375 (1987) [hereinafter Klemperer, Switching Costs].  
 54. See Edlin & Harris, supra note 22, at 181. 
 55. See Chen & Hitt, supra note 25, at 446. 
 56. See Edlin & Harris, supra note 22, at 181. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. at 182; see, e.g., Klemperer, Switching Costs, supra note 53, at 375; Klemperer, 
10
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the effort, time, and resources spent on familiarizing oneself with a 
product are learning costs. Research suggests that the degree of products’ 
significance and distinction,59 customers’ familiarities,60 as well as 
customers’ frequencies of repurchases,61 are positively correlated with 
learning costs.  
Learning how to use new online networking platforms may be 
challenging for some users. Every platform has its own layout and 
different functions. For those who use social networking applications less 
often, learning how to use a new platform can be time-consuming. 
Learning costs vary between individuals. For example, younger users 
who grew up with the Internet may spend less time learning how to set up 
personal profiles on different online networking platforms. In fact, most 
teenagers have access to multiple social networking applications from 
their smartphones.62 By contrast, older generations may face difficulties 
joining new networking platforms. As a result, a period of adjustment is 
to be expected in certain situations when users must learn how to use a 
new product. 
5. Contractual Costs 
Contractual costs refer to losses incurred if contractual obligations are 
violated. Awards and punishments are two common contractual cost 
approaches that businesses employ to strengthen relationships with 
customers.63  
For example, businesses establish loyalty programs to award existing 
customers. By providing benefits to loyal customers, the program 
encourages these customers to maintain long-term relationships with the 
business. Various rules guide these programs. For example, customers 
 
Competition, supra note 25, at 517. 
 59. See Edlin & Harris, supra note 22, at 182. A study posits that “[t]he more significant the 
differences are across products, and the longer or more concentrated the efforts required to learn how to 
use a different product, the greater the costs of switching between products.” Id. 
 60. Some empirical studies emphasize the level of familiarity with a website and purchasing rate. 
Bucklin and Sismeiro investigated the correlation between website browsing behaviors and the length of 
time spent on each page, finding that the more frequently the browsers visit a website, the longer time 
they spend on it. This finding reflects the fact that efforts to be familiar with new websites discourage 
switching. See Randolph E. Bucklin & Catarina Sismeiro, A Model of Web Site Browsing Behavior 
Estimated on Clickstream Data, 40 J. MKTG. RES. 249, 249 (2003). 
 61. Moe and Fader focus on visit frequency and purchasing rate. They found evidence that “people 
who visit a retail site more frequently have a greater propensity to buy.” See Wendy W. Moe & Peter S. 
Fader, Capturing Evolving Visit Behavior in Clickstream Data, 18 J. INTERACT. MKTG. 5, 5 (2004). 
 62. Seventy-one percent of teenagers between 13-17 years old use more than one social 
networking websites. ACT FOR YOUTH, Youth Statistics: Internet & Social Media, 
http://actforyouth.net/adolescence/demographics/internet.cfm. 
 63. See Edlin & Harris, supra note 22, at 180; See also Klemperer, Competition, supra note 25, at 
517-18. 
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may be required to purchase a certain quantity of goods or refer a certain 
number of friends to a business. Customers who fail to meet these 
contractual terms may lose their membership benefits in the loyalty 
program. In practice, loyalty programs are common in the food and 
beverage, cosmetics, and supplement and vitamins industries.64 
Similarly, businesses can strengthen relationships with consumers by 
including punitive clauses in contracts. For example, banks grant 
additional bonuses to customers on the condition that those customers 
deposit particular sums of money for a specified period of time. Failing 
to meet these conditions leads to the loss of that additional bonus. In some 
situations, consumers may even have to pay money back to the bank.65 
Similar systems are in place in the fitness, rental, and telecommunications 
industries.   
So far, it is not clear whether contractual costs exist on Facebook. 
When users agree to Facebook’s terms and conditions, they form a 
contractual relationship with the company. Users have the right to enjoy 
Facebook’s services and in turn agree to Facebook’s collection and use of 
their data for Facebook’s business purposes.66 Different from loyalty 
programs and punitive clauses, these terms neither render contractual 
rewards nor create obligations for users. It appears that users can leave, 
suspend, and stay on Facebook as long as they wish.  
6. Uncertainty Costs 
Uncertainty costs may arise for consumers in the context of experience 
products. Experience products are products that can be evaluated only 
after their purchase or consumption.67 Characteristics of these products 
are generally hard to identify in advance. Products in this category include 
legal and banking services. Additionally, the value of these products 
typically depends on individual consumers’ preferences. For example, 
people assess the quality of meals and haircuts differently. In these cases, 
switching costs emerge because “the experience a customer has had with 
the current supplier” clashes with “the lack of experience with alternative 
suppliers.”68  
Online networking platforms can be categorized as experience 
 
 64. Brad Davis, 10 Industries Where Loyalty Programs are Extremely Effective, STAMP ME (Dec. 
9, 2019), https://stampme.com/10-industries-where-loyalty-programs-are-extremely-effective/. 
 65. For example, many airline companies reward loyal clients with points calculated by mileage. 
The points can be exchanged for free flight tickets. Points can also expire if not used within a specific 
period of time See Yak, Miles and Points Programs Expiration Rules – What You Need to Know, POINTS 
YAK (Jan. 21, 2016),  https://pointsyak.com/credit-cards/miles-and-points-expiration-rules/ 
 66. Terms of Service, FACEBOOK (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.facebook.com/terms.php. 
 67. See Patterson, supra note 14, at 11.  
 68. Edlin & Harris, supra note 22, at 182. See also Klemperer, Competition, supra note 25, at 517. 
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products and are more likely to create uncertainty costs for two main 
reasons. First, the value of online networking platforms depends heavily 
on network effects.69 Therefore, the value experienced by users after 
switching to other online networking platforms depends on platforms’ 
user bases, and predicting how platforms’ user bases will develop has 
never been an easy task. Second, existing online networking platforms, 
including Facebook, modify their services dramatically to respond to fast-
changing market conditions. This business practice expands the gaps 
between consumers’ expected utility and the real utility of the product. 
Uncertainty costs also arise when an established market player is 
challenged by a new market entrant. For example, Facebook was a “first-
mover” in the realm of online networking platforms and thereby enjoyed 
reputational benefits. Research shows that early-movers naturally obtain 
benefits from their reputation.70 A first impression plays a critical role in 
forming consumers’ preferences. Because the first-mover receives greater 
attention from consumers,71 the first-mover will shape consumer 
expectations and understandings of the market. The reputational benefits 
create trust relationships with users, thereby strengthening users’ 
confidence and satisfaction with the first-mover’s products. Based on this 
analytical framework, users may have feelings of uncertainty leaving 
Facebook. 
Because it is unclear whether switching costs lock-in users to 
Facebook’s services, and this is a largely quantitative question, an 
empirical investigation is required to clarify the impact of switching costs 
on Facebook’s users. 
III. EMPIRICAL STUDY  
A. Research Design  
To examine whether Facebook’s users are locked into the platform, this 
Section tracks data on the number of users, time spent online, and 
advertising revenues of various online networking platforms following 
Facebook’s significant privacy violations occurring in 2011 and 2019. 
This study does not directly examine specific types of switching costs 
because consumers-specific data is not generally available. Instead, this 
study refers to two specific privacy violations to illustrate Facebook’s 
 
 69. Network effects happen when “adoption by different users is complimentary”. Therefore, 
one’s adoption increases other’s incentives to adopt. See Edlin & Hoparris, supra note 22, at 178. 
 70. Marvin B. Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-Mover Advantage, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT. 
J. 41, 46 (1988) (citing Birger Wernerfelt, Umbrella Branding as a Signal of New Product Quality: An 
Example of Signalling by Posting a Bond, 19 RAND J. OF ECON. 458, 462 (1988). 
 71. Lieberman & Montgomery, supra note 70, at 46. 
13
Cheng: Market Power and Switching Costs
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
2021] MARKET POWER AND SWITCHING COSTS 135 
relationship with its users following those violations.  
1. 2011-2012 Privacy Breaches  
In November 2011, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) filed a 
complaint against Facebook, claiming that Facebook was breaking its 
privacy protection promises.72 In August 2012, the FTC settled with 
Facebook on the condition that “Facebook must obtain consumers’ 
consent before sharing their information beyond established privacy 
settings” and take necessary measures to protect Facebook users. Based 
on these terms, Facebook signed the consent order.73 The FTC’s 
complaints and the settlement were widely covered by the media and 
inspired impassioned public discussions.74  
2. Violations of the 2012 Consent Order and Fines  
In 2019, the FTC launched another investigation into Facebook’s 
conduct. According to the complaint, Cambridge Analytica “had 
improperly obtained the private information of more than 50 million 
Facebook users” sometime in March 2018.75 The investigation examined 
whether Facebook breached the 2012 consent order. Ultimately, the 
Department of Justice, on behalf of the FTC, concluded that: 
Facebook repeatedly used deceptive disclosure and settings to 
undermine users’ privacy preferences in violation of its 2012 FTC order. 
 
 72. See Compare Facebook Settles FTC Charges That It Deceived Consumers By Failing To Keep 
Privacy Promises, F.T.C. (Nov. 29, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2011/11/facebook-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-failing-keep, with The FTC’s 
settlement with Facebook: Where Facebook went wrong, F.T.C. (Nov. 29, 2011),  
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2011/11/ftcs-settlement-facebook-where-
facebook-went-wrong. 
 73. See Facebook Must Obtain Consumers' Consent Before Sharing Their Information Beyond 
Established Privacy Settings, F.T.C. (Aug. 10, 2012),  https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2012/08/ftc-approves-final-settlement-facebook. 
 74. See e.g., Somini Sengupta, F.T.C Settles Privacy Issue at Facebook, N. Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 
2011),  https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/technology/facebook-agrees-to-ftc-settlement-on-
privacy.html;  Julianne Pepitone, Facebook Settles FTC Charges Over 2009 Privacy Breaches, CNN 
MONEY (Nov. 29, 2011, 3:09PM),  
https://money.cnn.com/2011/11/29/technology/facebook_settlement/index.htm; Frederic Lardinois, 
Facebook And FTC Settle Privacy Charges — No Fine, But 20 Years Of Privacy Audits TECH CRUNCH 
(Aug. 10, 2012, 1:21PM),  https://techcrunch.com/2012/08/10/facebook-ftc-settlement-12/; Diane Bartz 
& Alexei Oreskovic, Facebook Settles Privacy Case with FTC REUTERS (Nov. 29, 2011, 1:39PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-privacy-idUSTRE7AS21J20111129; Terrence O'Brien, 
FTC and Facebook Settle Privacy Dispute, Skip the Fine ENGADGET (Aug. 10, 2012), 
https://www.engadget.com/2012-08-10-ftc-and-facebook-settle-privacy-dispute-skip-the-fine.html. 
 75. See Julia Carrie Wong, Facebook to be Fined $5bn for Cambridge Analytica Privacy 
Violations – Reports GUARDIAN (Jul. 12, 2019, 6:12PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/12/facebook-fine-ftc-privacy-violations. 
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These tactics allowed the company to share users’ personal information 
with third-party apps that were downloaded by the user’s Facebook 
‘friends.’… [M]any users were unaware that Facebook was sharing such 
information, and therefore did not take the steps needed to opt-out of 
sharing. In addition, … Facebook took inadequate steps to deal with apps 
that it knew were violating its platform policies.76 
Upon completion of the investigation, the FTC imposed a $5 billion 
penalty on Facebook, the highest penalty in Commission history. In 
addition to paying the record-setting fine, Facebook had to meet 
“significant requirements to boost accountability and transparency.”77 
The investigation and subsequent fine were widely covered by all major 
news outlets and social media platforms in 201878 and 2019.79 Therefore, 
it is reasonable to infer that users in the U.S. were aware of Facebook’s 
violations.   
Modern economic theories have assumed that consumers change 
suppliers when their suppliers raise the prices or lower the quality of 
products. Further, literature has indicated that most digital service users' 
privacy concerns stem from e-commerce and online 
networking.80Applying the same framework to the online networking 
 
 76. FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Privacy Restrictions on Facebook, F.T.C. 
(Jul. 24, 2019),  https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-imposes-5-billion-penalty-
sweeping-new-privacy-restrictions. 
 77. Id.  
 78. See Tony Romm & Craig Timberg, FTC opens investigation into Facebook after Cambridge 
Analytica scrapes millions of users’ personal information, WASH. POST (March 20. 2018),  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/03/20/ftc-opens-investigation-into-
facebook-after-cambridge-analytica-scrapes-millions-of-users-personal-information/; Cecilia Kang et al., 
Facebook Faces Broadened Federal Investigations Over Data and Privacy, N. Y. TIMES (July 2, 2018),  
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/technology/facebook-federal-investigations.html; Kurt Wagner, 
Facebook may be facing a “multibillion-dollar” fine from the FTC. Here’s why., VOX (Feb. 14, 2019, 
5:45PM),  https://www.vox.com/2019/1/23/18193314/facebook-ftc-fine-investigation-explained-
privacy-agreement; and Lauren Feiner, Mark Zuckerberg’s Call for Tougher Internet Regulation won’t 
Save Facebook from these Investigations CNBC (Mar. 31, 2019, 10:03AM),  
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/31/facebook-federal-and-international-investigations-into-data-
privacy.html. 
 79. See e.g., Brian Fung, Facebook will Pay an Unprecedented $5 Billion Penalty over Privacy 
Breaches, CNN BUSINESS (Jul, 25, 2019, 1:08PM),  https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/24/tech/facebook-ftc-
settlement/index.html; Salvador Rodriguez, How Facebook Stumbled to the Edge of a Government 
Breakup, CNBC (Nov. 9, 2019, 9:00AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/09/facebooks-antitrust-
investigations-a-timeline-of-events.html; Mike Snider & Edward C. Baig, Facebook Fined $5 Billion by 
FTC, must Update and Adopt New Privacy, Security Measures, USA TODAY(Jul. 24, 2019, 8:54AM),  
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2019/07/24/facebook-pay-record-5-billion-fine-u-s-privacy-
violations/1812499001/; and Cecilia Kang, F.T.C. Approves Facebook Fine of About $5 Billion, N. Y. 
TIMES (July 12. 2019),  https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/technology/facebook-ftc-fine.html (search 
by article name). 
 80. See Eszter Hargittai & Alice Marwich, “What Can I Really Do?” Explaining the Privacy 
Paradox with Online Apathy, 10 INT. J. COMMUN. 3737, 3737, 3744-45 (2016); Spyros Kokolakis, 
Privacy Attitudes and Privacy Behavior: A Review of Current Research on the Privacy Paradox 
Phenomenon, 64 COMPUT. & SEC. 122, 122, 127-28 (2016). 
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market, it is expected that Facebook’s users would have rejected the 
platform or used it less frequently in response to the above mentioned 
privacy violations. Additionally, it is expected that new users will be 
added at a slower rate.  Under these conditions, one would expect to see a 
decline in Facebook’s advertising revenues. Furthermore, it is reasonable 
to expect Facebook’s users would seek out alternative online networking 
platforms. These platforms would have benefitted financially from the 
influx of new users and following increases in advertising revenues as a 
result of obtaining those users. As discussed below, the study tests these 
assumptions based on a review of the available data. 
However, some limitations should be noted. First, the study assumes 
that consumers will switch to other suppliers when current suppliers raise 
prices or lower the quality of their products. But consumers may not be 
rational in the real world, meaning that consumers may switch for reasons 
other than the price and quality of goods and services. Second, because of 
insufficient information about Facebook’s privacy violations during 
2011-2012 and 2018-2019, this study only identifies two privacy 
violations that may have incentivized Facebook users to leave the 
company. The study acknowledges that apart from the two privacy 
violations, other events may have led Facebook users to switch platforms. 
The study’s final limitation concerns data collection. Because of limited 
access to personal data, the study cannot collect all Facebook users’ data. 
Instead, the study collects data from a reliable dataset—Statista, which 
has comprehensive data related to online social networking platforms in 
the United States. 
B. Data Collection  
1. Scope  
This study focuses on the United States’ online networking market. 
Thus, the study collects data on users and advertising revenues from the 
following companies: Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Snapchat, Pinterest, 
Tumblr, and TikTok. 
In antitrust analyses, courts generally consider two markets: the 
product and geographic market. When examining the product market, 
courts test the interchangeability of multiple products from the 
perspective of consumers.81 Effectively, if consumers consider that 
Product A is substitutable with Product B, courts will conclude that 
Products A and B are in the same product market. As to the geographic 
 
 
 81. See Hovenkamp, supra note 16, at 122. 
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market, courts generally consider transportation costs.82 If transportation 
costs associated with purchasing Products A and B are not substantially 
different, courts will determine that the two products are in the same 
geographic market.   
While all platforms identified above have slight differences, they are 
comparable because they allow users to communicate within the digital 
space. For example, Instagram’s main service is online networking. The 
company is famous for its photo-sharing and video-sharing functions. 
Recently, Instagram added two new resources: IGTV and LIFE, allowing 
users to interact with friends more actively.83 Although Instagram offers 
multiple tools to its users, analogous products may be found in other 
online networking platforms such as Pinterest and Snapchat. 
Finally, the study focuses on data ranging from 2010 to 2020. Because 
the online networking market is rapidly evolving, modern networking 
platforms are quite different from their predecessors. Thus, older datasets 
may not provide accurate guidance to policymakers.   
2. Sources 
The study first investigates data collected from Google Trends. The 
database shows social media users’ reaction to the alleged two privacy 
violations. The study then examines data collected by Statista. Statista 
highlights changes in data. For example, one can compare advertising 
revenues by year or according to different online networking platforms. 
The platform also checks and validates the data. More than 2,000 
universities and academic institutions use Statista for research purposes.84 
Thus, it is a reputable source for statistical research. 
C. Analysis and Findings  
In examining the users’ reactions to Facebook’s data breaches, the 
study focuses on four data sets: (1) Google search volume, (2) number of 








 82. Id.  
 83. See Features, INSTAGRAM, https://about.instagram.com/features. 
 84. Trust is Earned When Actions Meet Words, STATISTA https://www.statista.com/aboutus/trust 
(last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
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The study used Google Trends to investigate the reactions to the 2019 
privacy violation. Google Trends shows “how frequently a given search 
term is entered into Google’s search engine relative to the site’s total 
search volume over a given period of time.”85 Facebook’s search volume 
may be used to highlight the public’s knowledge of their 2019 privacy 
violations. Additionally, one can infer whether users are considering 
switching to alternative platforms based on their Google searches.   
Figure 1 shows the Google search volume concerning the five major 
American networking platforms between June 1, 2018, and December 1, 
2020. The following search terms were used: Facebook, Instagram, 
Pinterest, Snapchat, and TikTok.  
The results show that Facebook’s search volume gradually decreased 
from June 2018 to December 2020. In comparison, the search volume of 
smaller platforms (Pinterest, Snapchat, and TikTok) rose gradually. 
Further, near the end of the search period, all five platforms’ search 
volumes were similar. Taken together, these observations suggest that 
Facebook users may have noticed the company’s privacy breaches in 
2019 and expressed interest in other platforms.  
To support this inference, this study considers Facebook’s user base, 
users’ time spent online, and advertising revenues. 
 
 85. Google Trends: What Is Google Trends?, WORDSTREAM, 
https://www.wordstream.com/google-trends (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
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Figure 2 captures the number of users who relied on Facebook between 
2010 and 2020. The data was drawn from Statista. It shows that Facebook 
has been steadily adding new users and the 2011 and 2019 privacy 
violations did not disturb this trend. It seems that Facebook users did not 
leave the platform following the violations, despite the fact that they were 
aware of the company’s wrongdoings.  
This observation does not conclusively show that Facebook has locked-
in its users. Other explanations may account for the growth of the 
company’s user base. For example, because the online networking market 
is still growing, it is possible that new users kept entering the market and 
ended up joining Facebook. Because of such uncertainties, a closer 
analysis is required. Therefore, the next data set looks at the rate by which 
Facebook’s user base grew over time to determine whether the high-
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Figure 3 captures the rate at which Facebook’s user base has changed 
over time. The graph demonstrates that Facebook’s user base expanded 
by 5% in 2010. However, the growth rate slowed following the 2011 
privacy investigations. Specifically, the growth rate decreased sharply 
during the last quarter of 2010 and the first quarter of 2011. 
Moreover, Figure 2 also demonstrates that because of the release of the 
Department of Justice’s 2011 report detailing Facebook’s privacy 
violations, the company’s 2011 growth rate did not match its growth rate 
in 2010. Significantly, following the release of the 2019 FTC report in 
July 2019, the growth rate once again slowed down.  
Collectively, these observations are consistent with the assumption that 
users’ willingness to join Facebook decreased following the 
aforementioned privacy violations. Alternatively, explanations for 
Facebook’s decreasing growth rate during the last quarter of 2010 and the 
first quarter of 2011 are that the company had already captured most 
online networking users by early 2011, and/or the demand for online 
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The growth of other online networking platforms during this same time 
period suggests that  Facebook’s privacy violations had a negative impact 
on the company’s growth.  
Figure 4 shows that in 2019 and 2020, Facebook had the lowest rate of 
growth, which stood at 2%. Comparatively, Twitter’s user base grew by 
3.5%. The growth rate of other platforms is notable as well: Instagram 
12.5%, Pinterest 4.3%, Snapchat 4.1%, TikTok 22%, Tumblr 3.8%. 
Therefore, Facebook’s 2019 privacy violations may have had a negative 
impact on its ability to attract new users. The study shows that users may 
have become less willing to use Facebook. However, it is not certain 
whether the new users who joined Twitter, Instagram, Pinterest, 
Snapchat, TikTok, and Tumblr are old Facebook users. Consequently, the 
study examines users’ time spent online and Facebook’s advertising 
revenues.  







Cheng: Market Power and Switching Costs
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021






















Figure 5 considers the time teenagers spent online. Teenagers made up 
nearly 10% of Facebook users in 2019.86 Therefore, teenagers’ reactions 
to the two privacy violations may have affected the competition in the 
online networking market. Additionally, it is generally recognized that 
teenagers are more familiar with online networking platforms. Teenagers 
may have lower learning costs when switching platforms. Thus, they are 
less likely to be locked-in. For these reasons, the study tracks usage habits 
of users who are under 18 to determine whether teenage Facebook users 
switched platforms as a result of the two privacy violations.  
The study looks at three major online networking platforms: Facebook, 
Twitter, and Instagram. The data was drawn from Statista. The figure 
shows that Facebook had the largest online user base in the Fall of 2012 
followed by Twitter and Instagram. After the 2011 privacy violations, 
Facebook’s teenage user base continued to shrink. Conversely, 
Instagram’s teenage user base grew from 2012 to 2019.  
Figure 5 therefore supports that proposition that teenagers are flexible 
in their commitments to online networking platforms. Although Facebook 
is still the largest online networking platform, the company does not limit 
teenagers’ choices regarding where to conduct social networking 
 
 86. See Pew Research Center, Social Media Fact Sheet, available at 
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/social-media/. 
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activities. Furthermore, the data suggest that teenagers abandoned 
Facebook in favor of other online networking platforms. Notably, in 
addition to privacy concerns, there are alternative explanations for 
teenagers moving away from Facebook. One such example: they may 
leave because their parents started to use Facebook, and they do not want 
their parents to see their online profile.  




















Changes in advertising revenues may detect the presence of lock-in 
effects. It is inferable that Facebook could demand that advertisers pay 
higher fees if it maintains a large and an expanding user base. Facebook 
can use these advertising revenues to develop more services to further 
grow its user base.87 Ultimately, this circle led to Facebook's 
unprecedented business success. Notably, in 2020, Facebook earned over 
$ 2.1 billion from advertising revenues.88  
As illustrated above, a large user base is critical to Facebook’s ability 
 
 87. See Rob Frieden, Two-Sided Internet Markets and the Need to Assess Both Upstream and 
Downstream Impacts, 68 AM. U. L. R. 713, 723-25 (2019). As Facebook does not charge non-business 
users for its social networking service, advertising fees from business users become the main source of 
revenue. The company uses the revenue to develop its platforms to attract more users, allowing it to charge 
business users with higher advertising fees to generate greater revenue.   
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to attract advertisers. Lock-in users are undoubtedly one of the key 
ingredients to generate advertising revenues. Advertising revenues grow 
proportionally to the level of users on Facebook. More users and time 
spent online translate to Facebook’s ability to charge higher advertising 
fees. 
Figure 6 shows the growth rate for Facebook’s advertising revenues. 
The data shows that the growth rate slowed following the 2011 and 2012 
privacy breaches followed by a sharp increase between 2012 and 2013. 
Notably, the second sharp decline occurred during the 2019 privacy 
violations.  
This significant reduction in advertising revenues indicates that there 
were likely changes in the company’s user base. Combined with the other 
findings on changes in Facebook’s user base, the data indicates that the 
two privacy violations had a negative effect on Facebook’s user base and, 
in turn, affected the company’s advertising revenues. This conclusion is 
consistent with the findings captured in Figure 3 and Figure 4. 
The alternative explanation for Facebook’s reduced advertising 
revenues is that the company’s unacceptable reputation for privacy 
violations led to businesses’ unwillingness to advertise on the platform. 
Even so, this does not invalidate the study’s findings. Rather, this 
explanation would reveal the presence of competing firms that are 
interchangeable with Facebook, demonstrating businesses’ freedom to 
switch among platforms. The finding therefore supports the inference that 
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Figure 7 compares Facebook’s advertising revenues to the other 
platforms before and after the 2019 privacy violations. It indicates that 
after the 2019 privacy violations, Facebook’s advertising revenues 
dropped from $10 billion to $8.4 billion (a 16% decrease). However, at 
the same time, Instagram’s advertising revenues increased from $9.45 
billion to $13.86 billion (a 146% increase), Snapchat’s advertising 
revenues rose from $1.53 billion to $2.11 billion (a 138% increase), and 
Pinterest’s advertising revenues increased from $1 billion to $1.39 billion 
(a 139% increase).  
These findings suggest that market factors did not likely influence 
Facebook’s diminished advertising revenues. Other online networking 
platforms in similar conditions experienced growth.  This may also 
indicate that the 2019 privacy violations reduced Facebook users’ 
willingness to stay on the platform. Facebook’s loss of users affected its 
advertising revenues. Facebook’s advertising revenues declined, while 
the revenues of its competitors grew based on new users and advertising. 
These findings suggest that users can freely switch between various 
online networking platforms.   
IV. CONCLUSION  
Switching costs can indicate Facebook’s market power. Switching 
costs can be divided into six types: search costs, compatibility costs, 
transaction costs, learning costs, contractual costs, and uncertainty costs. 
Among them, compatibility, learning, and uncertainty costs are most 
likely to occur in the online networking market. These costs may 
discourage Facebook’s users from switching to other networking 
platforms.  
However, the findings of this Article suggest that Facebook may not 
have substantial market power in the online networking market. The 
Article analyzed the data concerning the number of users, time spent 
online, and advertising revenues of major online networking platforms 
before and after Facebook’s privacy violations in 2011 and 2019.  
This Article found that Facebook’s search volume decreased gradually 
beginning in June 2018. Similarly, Facebook’s users and advertising 
revenues decreased after the announcement of privacy violations. 
Conversely, Google search volume increased for other platforms. 
Furthermore, new users were added to these platforms, and this translated 
into additional advertising revenues. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that Facebook users are still free to switch among various online 
networking platforms. No substantial switching costs discourage users 
from abandoning the platform. As a result, under the switching costs 
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approach, although Facebook may still have market power, that power is 
neither significant nor limitless. Instead, Facebook users’ abilities to 
freely switch among different platforms—and the data suggesting that 
they do—reduces the company’s ability to exploit users. Further, these 
findings can be used to argue that Facebook would not have sufficient 
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